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THE DEBT FINANCING OF 
PARENTHOOD 
MELISSA B. JACOBY* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the department of controversy, a market for babies enjoys a prime place. 
From proposals to liberalize adoption pricing in the 1970s to technological 
advances in assisted reproduction today, family expansion that requires 
intermediaries raises questions for nearly every academic discipline and many 
fields of law. 
Throughout these debates, people from across the ideological spectrum 
often maintain that babies and related rights should not be sold. A small group 
of scholars has started to approach assisted reproduction, surrogacy, and 
adoption with the same analytical tools that they would apply to less-contested 
markets.1 Such work is central to improving the provision of goods and services 
relating to parenthood and family expansion. But, so far, it has largely left 
unexplored the role of debt financing and particularly repeat-playing lenders in 
this industry. 
This article reflects on the role of lenders in the parenthood market and how 
they might facilitate access and shape this industry in more profound ways. 
Standing at a kiosk within a fertility clinic, a forty-two-year-old woman of 
modest means can seek approval, in minutes, of a $20,000 Capital One Fertility 
installment loan at 25.99% interest for a round of in vitro fertilization (IVF) and 
the eggs of a younger woman.2 Lenders also promote and distribute such 
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 1. See, e.g., DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS 
DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 3–6 (2006). 
 2. See infra III. 
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unsecured installment loans through sellers of IVF package deals and money-
back guarantees. 
Lenders are regularly in the business of financing adoption costs too. Via 
foundations and agencies, Bank of America offers unsecured adoption loans in 
amounts up to $25,000, while JP Morgan Chase has offered a “Chase New 
Additions” adoption home-equity line of credit for significantly larger sums.3 
Foundations and nonprofit adoption agencies that offer loans sometimes refrain 
from charging interest at all, or they charge low rates normally associated with 
borrowers who are practically risk-free. But these lenders may attach other 
strings that relate to the child’s origin or such characteristics of the potential 
parent as religious observance, marital status, sexual orientation, and adherence 
to traditional gender roles.4 
The development of specific products and marketing channels is consistent 
with claims that the posited parenthood market exists and is thriving. This 
makes it important to shift the focus from the threshold inquiry of such a 
market’s desirability to the best regulatory structure. It also forces one to 
consider whether the addition of lenders to this market might relieve or 
exacerbate the conditions that give people pause about parenthood markets in 
the first place. 
This task is especially critical for assisted reproduction. Mainstream fertility-
treatment lending complicates a common narrative that most people cannot 
access these services unless they have insurance coverage or “happen to be 
rich.”5 Although calls for regulation have not necessarily abated on this basis,6 
the presumption that only a small set of elite customers could buy access has 
perhaps eased the urgency of these demands. Even if people long have 
borrowed money on an ad hoc basis for access to fertility treatment and 
adoptions, the distribution of consumer credit products through fertility clinics 
and other related channels could increase demand and access to IVF and 
related procedures considerably. Lack of insurance coverage is not a reliable 
substitute for substantive oversight of the assisted-reproduction industry. 
Repeat-playing institutional lenders should be recognized as relevant to 
political-economy analysis of the parenthood market. These lenders may 
improve or aggravate a variety of issues in this market, which in turn can affect 
 
 3. See infra III. 
 4. See infra III. 
 5. CHARIS THOMPSON, MAKING PARENTS: THE CHOREOGRAPHY OF REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 26–27 (2005). 
 6. A list of scholars’ calls for regulation can be found in Jaime King, Predicting Probability: 
Regulating the Future of Preimplantation Genetic Screening, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 
283, 288 n.20 (2008); Michael J. Malinowski, Creating Life? Examining the Legal, Ethical, and Medical 
Issues of Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A Law-Policy Proposal to Know Where Babies Come 
from During the Reproductive Revolution, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 549, 552 (2006). For arguments 
against regulation, see Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and 
Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 22 (2003) (discussing the benefits to 
nontraditional parents of the lack of public regulation of the parenthood market). 
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the need or demand for regulation. This article notes several possible contexts 
in which these lenders might affect the distribution of goods and services in 
assisted reproduction, including egg-supplier compensation, expanding 
parenthood possibilities for same-sex couples, and quality control of IVF. 
Section II introduces the issue of financing assisted reproduction and 
adoption. Section III reviews specialty loans for assisted reproduction and 
adoption, reflecting traditional research in case law and legal and nonlegal 
scholarly literature, as well as results from a review of news media and Web 
sites of prominent intermediaries and service suppliers. Section IV presents a 
sampling of political-economy implications relevant to assisted reproduction, 
leaving other issues for future investigation. Section V concludes. 
II 
PARENTHOOD MARKET FINANCE: BACKGROUND 
A. Fertility Barriers and Options 
The traditional and common definition of infertility covers those who have 
not conceived after a designated period of unprotected heterosexual 
intercourse.7 But assisted reproduction is also important to those with 
“structural infertility”—that is, those who want to be parents but do not want to 
engage in heterosexual intercourse.8 
Assisted-reproduction specialists and clinics charge a lot of money to 
attempt to surmount fertility barriers of either kind. Artificial or alternative 
insemination is among the least invasive and the cheapest options, but still may 
cost over $1000 for the initial round.9 The price of just one round of IVF or 
related processes far exceeds what an average household of four spends out of 
 
 7. See, e.g., SPAR, supra note 1, at 1–2, 31 (“Roughly 10 to 15 percent of all adults experience 
some form of infertility.”). Infertility is difficult to measure because many do not report to their 
doctors. See Michele Goodwin, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Double Bind: The Illusory 
Choice of Motherhood, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 18 (2005) (“Poorer women, who lack health 
coverage, are likely to be disproportionately underrepresented or unaccounted for with infertility 
statistics.”). For racial differences in diagnosing infertility, see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE 
BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 255 (1997). 
 8. Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 24 (2008); see also Ertman, supra note 6; Charles P. Kindregan Jr. 
& Steven H. Snyder, Clarifying the Law of ART: The New American Bar Association Model Act 
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 42 FAM. L.Q. 203, 226–27 (2008) (discussing a more 
inclusive definition of infertility that includes “the desire to achieve pregnancy by means other than 
sexual intercourse”); Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated 
Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 613 (2003). 
 9. Ertman, supra note 6, at 15; cf. Amy B. Monahan, Value-Based Mandated Health Benefits 25 
(Univ. of Minn., Working Paper No. 25, 2008) (citing a range of monthly costs for ovulation stimulation 
and artificial insemination from $200 to $5000, depending on drugs and medical monitoring). Artificial 
insemination is the most frequently used. See John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted 
Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 323, 324, 349 (2004). 
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pocket on health care for an entire year.10 Employing a gestational surrogate 
costs tens of thousands of dollars in jurisdictions in which the parties believe 
courts will enforce the underlying contracts.11 
Although the comparison is sometimes resisted, adoption is functionally an 
alternative route to family expansion for those with fertility barriers.12 Adoption 
costs vary greatly depending on the type of adoption and the characteristics of 
the child.13 Adopting children from foster care is relatively inexpensive, at least 
in terms of up-front costs.14 But costs for many adoptions can be $30,000 or 
more.15 
Some couples with fertility barriers “want what to them is irreplaceable, and 
they will frequently pay whatever they can. They will mortgage their houses, 
sell their cars, deplete the family savings.”16 Others with fertility barriers refrain 
 
 10. For IVF costs, see SPAR, supra note 1, at 59 tbl.2-3 (listing costs at representative clinics). 
According to the latest Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, out-of-pocket expenditure on health-
insurance premiums in 2004 was $2336 for a family of three or more persons. DIDEM BERNARD & 
JESSICA BANTHIN, MED. EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY, FAMILY-LEVEL EXPENDITURES ON 
HEALTH CARE AND INSURANCE PREMIUMS AMONG THE U.S. NONELDERLY POPULATION, 2004, at 
5, 13 (2007). Mean total expenditures for privately insured families were $6430. Id. at 2. 
 11. Gestational surrogacy costs range from $30,000 to $120,000. SPAR, supra note 1, at 92, 96 
(describing prices as of 2004). On who actually profits from such transactions, see Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203 (2009). 
 12. SPAR, supra note 1, at 210 (“Both sides of this market would prefer to believe that they are not 
substitutes for one another. But in reality, of course, they are.”); Krawiec, supra note 11 (noting that 
intended parents for whom assisted reproduction is unsuccessful or unavailable may resort to 
adoption). On whether it is truly a substitute, see Gillian Hewitson, The Market for Surrogate 
Motherhood Contracts, 73 ECON. RECORD 212, 213 (1997). On the social construction of the preference 
for biological children, see, for example, ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION, 
INFERTILITY, AND THE NEW WORLD OF CHILD PRODUCTION 93 (1993); ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 
267 (referring to the desire for genetically related children as “cultural artifact”); id. at 260 (“Infertile 
white couples are expected to turn to adoption only as a last resort, after exhausting every available 
means of producing a genetically related child. The Black community, on the other hand, expects its 
financially secure members to reach out to the thousands of Black children in need of a home.”). See 
generally SPAR, supra note 1, at 160; Susan Freilich Appleton, Adoption in the Age of Reproductive 
Technology, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 393, 432 (observing that adoption agencies encourage potential 
parents to think of adoption as a last resort “by rejecting prospective adopters who are simultaneously 
exploring medical interventions to have a child”); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Uncovering the Rationale for 
Requiring Infertility in Surrogacy Arrangements, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 337, 340 (2003) (discussing how 
states used to give adoption preference to people with known infertility). For a historical perspective, 
see Viviana A. Zelizer, From Baby Farms to Baby M, SOCIETY, March 1988, at 23, 24 (reviewing 
changes to the value of children to adults generally and noting that “[b]y 1937, infant adoption was 
being touted as the latest American fad.”). 
 13. See Michele Goodwin, The Free-Market Approach to Adoption: The Value of a Baby, 26 B.C. 
THIRD WORLD L.J. 61, 66–67 (2006) (comparing costs of adoption for white and black infants). 
 14. See Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging Racial Preferences in Adoptions, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1415, 1441 (2006) (debunking the myth that international adoptions are cheaper than domestic 
ones, particularly when compared to African American children). 
 15. See, e.g., SPAR, supra note 1, at 179 tbl.6-1 (listing domestic adoption-placement fees from 2004 
for eight agencies, with only two charging on an income-based sliding scale); id. at 184 (listing foreign-
adoption fees by agency and specific program fees by country). 
 16. SPAR supra note 1, at 4; see also Elizabeth Heitman, Infertility as a Public Health Problem: Why 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies Are Not the Answer, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 89, 96 (1995) 
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from assisted reproduction,17 or from adoption, or both.18 Although cost is not 
the exclusive sorting factor,19 it certainly is an important one.20 
B. Tax and Insurance 
Tax laws offer some subsidies to intended parents. Medical expenses are 
deductible from federal-tax obligations if they exceed 7.5% of an itemizing 
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.21 An Internal Revenue Service publication 
condones using this deduction for fertility treatments, including IVF and 
temporary storage of eggs or sperm.22 The federal tax code also provides an 
adoption tax credit that phases out for wealthier families.23 One commentator 
 
(“Infertile couples reportedly willing to try and to pay ‘almost anything’ to create their own baby are 
not unlike many chronically ill Americans searching for a cure.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Marianne Bitler & Lucie Schmidt, Health Disparities and Infertility; Impacts of State-
Level Insurance Mandates, 85 FERTILITY & STERILITY 858, 859 (2006) (“Of the 6.2 million women with 
impaired fecundity in 1995, 2.7 million (44%) had ever sought treatment.”); Daar, supra note 8, at 29 
(“Generally, only half of all individuals who are diagnosed as infertile seek treatment to assist them in 
reproduction.”); Dorothy Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935, 937, 941 
(1996) (discussing possible reasons for racial disparities in the use of reproductive technology); Barton 
H. Hamilton & Brian McManus, Infertility Treatment Markets: The Effects of Competition and Policy 
3 (Oct. 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.olin.wustl.edu/faculty/hamiltonb/ 
wpapers/Infertility%20Treatment%20Markets.pdf) (“Access to ART is a central issue in infertility 
treatment because of the large difference between the number of American couples who report 
reproductive difficulties and those who use ART.”). 
 18. See BARTHOLET, supra note 12, at 30–32 (“The adoption world does essentially nothing to 
reach out to the infertile to educate them about adoption possibilities.”). For barriers to adoption 
compared to reproductive medicine, see Appleton, supra note 12, at 444–46. 
 19. See ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 251–64 (stating “[b]lacks make up a disproportionate number of 
infertile people avoiding reproductive technologies” and reviewing reasons beyond economic factors); 
Daar, supra note 8, at 34–40 (including among barriers to access psychological factors and some 
discrimination against certain groups); see also Hamilton & McManus, supra note 17, at 3–4 (discussing 
how increased competition between clinics is an alternative method of expanding access, although 
effects are not identical). 
 20. See SPAR, supra note 1, at 30 (“In this market . . . price acts harshly as a constraint on 
demand.”). 
 21. 26 U.S.C. § 213(a) (2006). 
 22. I.R.S. Publication 502 (2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p502/index.html 
(reporting that deductible expenses include procedures to “overcome an inability to have children” 
including “[p]rocedures such as in vitro fertilization (including temporary storage of eggs or sperm)” 
and reversal surgery and other procedures). Medical care is “the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, 
or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body.” 26 
U.S.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2006). See generally Katherine T. Pratt, Inconceivable? Deducting the Costs of 
Fertility Treatment, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1121 (2004) (discussing the taxation of fertility treatment 
costs); Anna L. Benjamin, Note, The Implications of Using the Medical Expense Deduction of I.R.C. 
213 to Subsidize Assisted Reproductive Technology, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1117 (2004) (addressing 
the implications of using the medical-expense deduction to subsidize fertility treatments). 
 23. For taxable years beginning in 2008, the maximum federal adoption tax credit is $11,650. 26 
U.S.C. § 23(b)(1) (Supp. II 2008); Rev. Proc. 2007-66, 2007-45 I.R.B. 3–4. This adoption tax allowance 
is a credit against taxes due under the Internal Revenue Code. § 23(a)(1). It can be carried forward if a 
portion of the credit is unused, but it is not “refundable.” § 23(c)(1). The tax credit starts phasing out 
for taxpayers with modified adjusted gross income exceeding $174,730 and is completely phased out if 
income exceeds $214,730. Rev. Proc. 2007-66, 2007-45 I.R.B. 4. 
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has asserted that this credit is sufficient to cover the costs of some domestic 
adoptions out of foster care.24 Although the current federal-tax treatment can 
incentivize family expansion, it does not help those lacking the means to pay the 
up-front costs of adoption or fertility treatments. This perhaps explains the 
heavy emphasis on insurance in debates about assisted-reproduction finance. 
Most health-insurance plans do not directly cover assisted reproduction.25 
Fewer than a third of states mandate that insurance plans cover some fertility 
services or mandate that insurers offer coverage.26 For at least twenty years, 
advocates of intended parents have been lobbying lawmakers to conceptualize 
infertility as a disease or its treatment as a medical necessity and to adopt 
mandates.27 
In states where such mandates are in place, rates of access to assisted 
reproduction have been significantly higher.28 But many people with fertility 
barriers do not have coverage for fertility treatments even in those states. Some 
people have no insurance for any medical care. Others are covered through self-
insuring employers, to which mandatory-coverage rules do not apply.29 
According to one recent analysis, no state requires insurance coverage of IVF 
or artificial insemination for same-sex couples.30 
Still, if additional states or the federal government mandated coverage, 
significantly more people would seek access to assisted reproduction.31 
Commentators do not universally support this result. Some scholars are critical 
 
 24. Maldonado, supra note 14, at 1441 n.124. 
 25. By recent counts, about a quarter of health-insurance plans cover some fertility diagnoses or 
treatments. Lucie Schmidt, Effects of Infertility Insurance Mandates on Fertility, 26 J. HEALTH ECON. 
431, 432 (2007); see also Monahan, supra note 9, at 30 (offering estimates of large-employer coverage 
for various diagnoses and treatments of infertility). 
 26. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 50 STATES SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS 
RELATED TO INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR INFERTILITY THERAPY (2008), available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/50infert.htm; American Society of Reproductive Medicine, 
Frequently Asked Questions About Infertility, http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html#Q8 (last visited 
June 23, 2008) (listing fourteen states whose laws “require insurers to either cover or offer to cover 
some form of infertility diagnosis and treatment”). 
 27. Peter J. Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issues and Options, 22 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 1215, 1217 (1997); Sonia L. Nazario, Infertility Insurance Gains Backing, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 5, 1989. For a discussion of the efforts to characterize infertility as a disease, see Margarete 
Sandelowski & Sheryl de Lacey, The Uses of a “Disease”: Infertility as a Rhetorical Vehicle, in 
INFERTILITY AROUND THE GLOBE: NEW THINKING ON CHILDLESSNESS, GENDER, AND 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 33, 36–37 (Marcia C. Inhorn & Frank van Balen eds., 2002). 
 28. See, e.g., Neumann, supra note 27, at 1216–17 (reviewing studies). 
 29. See Amy Monahan, Federalism, Federal Regulation, or Free Market? An Examination of 
Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1361, 1371. About eighty-five percent of 
companies with more than 1000 employees self-insure, and, overall, self-insuring companies account for 
half the workforce employed by companies offering health insurance. Christina H. Park, Prevalence of 
Employer Self-Insured Health Benefits: National and State Variation, 57 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 340, 
347 (2000). 
 30. See Monahan, supra note 9, at 48. 
 31. Neumann, supra note 27, at 1220. 
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of mandates generally and question the distribution of their benefits.32 
Mandating fertility-treatment coverage is a hard sell when so many people lack 
any health insurance.33 Mandates also steer some intended parents toward 
assisted reproduction who might otherwise have seriously considered 
adoption.34 One scholar notes that “providing insurance for expensive fertility 
treatments but not adoption (which can also cost thousands of dollars) 
ironically makes these technologies the only alternative some people can 
afford.”35 She and others posit that preventive care and promotion of general 
health to reduce infertility ex ante could be a better use of funds.36 
More fundamentally, mandatory coverage is controversial because of the 
underlying services.37 Assisted reproduction has many supporters who frame it 
as a component of reproductive freedom, but it also attracts objections from a 
range of parties, including religious organizations and some feminists.38 In 
addition, some fear these technologies will be used to select children with 
particular traits.39 The live-birth rate from IVF and related procedures for some 
 
 32. Mandated coverage faces objections not specific to reproductive medicine. See Clark C. 
Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health Care, 69 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 62 (Autumn 2006) (discussing the role of mandates in raising costs and mandates 
as the product of special-interest lobbying “in an atmosphere of general consumer–voter disinterest”); 
Barak D. Richman, Insurance Expansions: Do They Hurt Those They Try To Help?, 26 HEALTH AFF. 
1345, 1348 (2007) (finding that mandated insurance coverage did not equalize the use of pharmaceutical 
and mental-health services among vulnerable populations). 
 33. See Neumann, supra note 27, at 1218–19 (“An emotional debate has attended the issue of 
health insurance coverage for IVF.”); Carson Strong, Too Many Twins, Triplets, Quadruplets, and So 
On: A Call for New Priorities, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 272, 276 (2003) (“Particularly relevant is the fact 
that millions of people in the United States lack health insurance and do not qualify for Medicaid or 
Medicare.”). 
 34. See BARTHOLET, supra note 12, at 211–12 (lamenting that the “significant IVF-related 
regulatory move” has been coverage mandates rather than imposing stricter regulations on IVF). 
 35. ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 290; see also BARTHOLET, supra note 12, at 34–35 (describing how 
society gives “preferred treatment to those who choose child production over child adoption”); 
Neumann, supra note 27, at 1225–26, 1232 (“Any decision by health insurers regarding IVF has 
implications for adoption.”). See generally Appleton, supra note 12, at 427, 428–31 (discussing barriers 
to adoption that do not exist for reproductive medicine and the possibility that they affect demand). 
 36. See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 291 (“Research designed to reduce infertility, programs 
that facilitate adoption, and the general provision of basic human needs are examples of expenditures 
that would help a far broader range of people than IVF.”); Heitman, supra note 16, at 96–97 
(conceptualizing infertility as a public-health problem). 
 37. Some of the controversy relates to the use of extra fertilized eggs that will not be discussed 
here. See, e.g., Steven Goldberg, Technology Unbound: Will Funded Libertarianism Dominate the 
Future?, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 21, 27–28 (2007) (“To many Americans, a ‘spare embryo’ is a 
human life. As a result, discarding an embryo is entirely unacceptable.”). 
 38. See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 56 (“Feminists are well placed to understand the special 
burden that involuntary childlessness places on women, but they are ambivalent about supporting 
women who seek infertility treatments because of the implicit support that this seems to lend to 
conventional gender roles and gendered stratification.”); Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal 
Responses to Technological Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 
505, 522–23 (2005) (reviewing Catholic objections to IVF). 
 39. See Mary Crossley, Dimensions of Equality in Regulating Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 9 
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 273, 285 (2005) (discussing trait-selection practices); Goodwin, supra note 7, 
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users is very low, and some clinics inflate claims of achievement to attract 
customers.40 Social scientists have observed that, for some women, the failure to 
reproduce after invasive and time-consuming treatments imposes trauma 
independent of any original disappointment from fertility barriers.41 Due to 
current practices in assisted reproduction, those who become pregnant have a 
much greater likelihood of higher-order multiple births, which produce health 
risks for the mother and children.42 Families may experience financial hardship 
as a result, although neither the families nor their fertility clinics fully 
internalize the very high costs of their resulting medical needs.43 Indeed, 
 
at 31 (discussing the use of procedures to choose sex and features of children); King, supra note 6, at 
285 (“The technology has been a godsend to couples with family histories of genetic disorders and 
chromosomal mutations causing infertility. However, expanding its use to permit prospective parents to 
select embryos based on a wide array of genetic characteristics presents substantial risks to individuals 
involved in the procedure and to society as a whole.”). 
 40. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 7, at 22 (“Despite its popularity, ART is a gamble: there are no 
guarantees of pregnancy (although some doctors make exaggerated claims that they can help 95% of 
patients conceive).”); Neumann, supra note 27, at 1230 (“The concern has been compounded by the 
fact that programs have used varying definitions of what constitutes a success: some programs have 
defined a success as a “live birth,” while others have used a ‘pregnancy,’ whether or not the pregnancy 
came to term.”); Noah, supra note 8, at 614 (describing “questions . . . about the accuracy of 
promotional claims made by fertility clinics”); Strong, supra note 33, at 272 (describing “misleading 
advertising by some infertility programs, particularly in regard to pregnancy success rates”). 
 41. See ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 248–49 (noting how “arduous” the IVF process is, “usually 
followed by heartbreaking disappointment,” the physical and emotional trauma of which concerns 
many feminists); Charis Cussins, Producing Reproduction: Techniques of Normalization and 
Naturalization in Infertility Clinics, in REPRODUCING REPRODUCTION 66, 74 (Sarah Franklin & 
Helena Ragoné eds., 1998) (“Infertility clinics expect infertility treatments to be stressful, and almost 
all clinics have in-house psychologists to counsel patients (at an additional cost).”); Heitman, supra note 
16, at 95 (discussing how disappointed expectations compound the trauma of fertility barriers); 
Sandelowski & de Lacey, supra note 27, at 38 (reviewing research on the impact of failure at various 
phases of treatment). 
 42. See, e.g., Hamilton & McManus, supra note 17, at 4 (calling multiple births “socially expensive 
and dangerous”); Heitman, supra note 16, at 95 (“The growing use of infertility treatments nationwide 
has been associated with a marked rise in the number of multiple-gestation pregnancies and an 
attendant incidence of related complications and costs for mothers and babies.”); Moses, supra note 38, 
at 583–84 (discussing the relationship between multiple birth and health risks); Neumann, supra note 
27, at 1226 (discussing health risks to the mother); John Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to 
Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 10 (2004) (“The most serious health 
problem posed by assisted reproduction is the high rate of multiple gestations.”); Strong, supra note 33, 
at 272 (discussing multiple births and their consequences, and positing that the problem is that “too 
much weight is given to the autonomy of infertile couples and not enough to the interests of the 
children.”); see also Cussins, supra note 41, at 75 (“The rigors of repeated invasive techniques and 
hormonal hyperstimulation on women, and the associated culture of perseverance, have been much 
criticized in infertility medicine.”); King, supra note 6, at 308 (discussing health risks to the mother in 
an unsuccessful pregnancy); Wilson, supra note 12, at 344–47 (discussing literature on the risks to 
children born through IVF or ISCI). Some studies show a lower rate of multiple births when intended 
parents have insurance coverage for assisted reproduction. See THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 4 tbl.1.1 
(reviewing data); Strong, supra note 33, at 275 (“The study found that in the states with comprehensive 
coverage there was a statistically significant decrease in the number of preembryos per transfer and the 
multiple birth rate per transfer cycle.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 7, at 3–4 (“Largely ignored are agency, financial incentives, 
choice, and the health risks associated with the technology.”); Moses, supra note 38, at 584 (discussing 
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scholarly articles are referring to assisted reproduction as gambling.44 Thus, 
although some studies suggest that mandating insurance coverage of assisted 
reproduction would impose relatively little cost, expansion of mandates is 
neither inevitable nor universally supported. 
Furthermore, it would be incorrect to assume that mandated, or otherwise-
expanded, insurance coverage resolves financial-access questions. By design, 
insurance products normally do not cover all costs associated with a particular 
service or treatment, and likely would not do so in this situation either.45 People 
with private insurance coverage in particular incur significant out of pocket 
expense, and sometimes more than the uninsured who avoid getting health 
care.46 To the extent that insurance coverage incentivizes intended parents to 
seek treatment in the first place, insurance expansions could expand rather than 
diminish the demand for supplemental credit products. 
C. Alternative Financing Approaches 
Notwithstanding limits on tax subsidies and insurance coverage, some 
intended parents do seek services on what many commentators have assumed is 
a cash basis.47 Every year, thousands of people pay out of pocket for assisted 
reproduction,48 and those considering adoption likewise need cash to prepare 
and complete the transaction. Recognizing the potential to attract patients 
without deep pockets or insurance, standalone companies and clinics have 
 
the health problems and financial burdens of multiple births); Noah, supra note 8, at 619–24 (describing 
the problems with multiple births, low birth weight, and prematurity). 
 44. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 7, at 22 (“Despite its popularity, ART is a gamble . . . .”); 
Neumann, supra note 27, at 1219 (noting others who have referred to IVF use as gambling); David 
Schmittlein & Donald Morrison, A Live Baby or Your Money Back: The Marketing of In Vitro 
Fertilization Procedures, 49 MGMT. SCI. 1618, 1619 (2003) (referring to couples considering IVF as 
“placing the largest-scale single [financial] gamble of their lives”). 
 45. Some mandate legislation prohibits higher cost-sharing for fertility treatments than for other 
medical services, but does not prohibit cost-sharing altogether. See, e.g., Family Building Act of 2007, 
H.R. 2892, 110th Cong. § 2707(c) (2007); S. Res. 759, 2007 Sess., at § 4 (N.C. 2007). 
 46. Jessica S. Banthin et al., The Financial Burden of Health Care 2001–2004, HEALTH AFF., Jan. 
2008, at 188, 190 (reporting on the increase in financial burden from health care being driven by people 
with private insurance). 
 47. See, e.g., Cussins, supra note 41, at 72 (reporting from clinic observation that “[i]f you are not 
covered for the treatment and are not prepared verbally to attest that you can personally cover the 
costs, no scheduling will occur. If you have been seen but have reneged on a payment, no subsequent 
appointments will be made either.”); Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or 
Paper Tiger?, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 661–62 (1997) (“[C]onsumers largely pay cash for services 
rendered[;] . . . in most cases patients either pay cash or use credit cards for all services . . . .”); Noah, 
supra note 8, at 607, 616 (referring to reproductive technology as being in a market in which most 
patients pay out of pocket in full); Barton H. Hamilton & Brian McManus, Technology Diffusion and 
Market Structure: Evidence from Infertility Treatment Markets 3, 8 (Sept. 2005) (unpublished article), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=813826 (describing how the fertility 
market is a health-care market based on direct patient payments). 
 48. See Goodwin, supra note 7, at 50–51 (“Indeed, that thousands of infertile couples annually pay 
out-of-pocket costs for assisted conception technologies further demonstrates the demand for such 
services.”). 
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offered money-back guarantees or package deals on multiple rounds of IVF.49 
One academic study found that money-back-guarantee programs are not 
profitable unless they channel younger and “less infertile” patients into IVF.50 
Two national businesses engage in a robust trade of these arrangements. The 
consumer-services division of IntegraMed, a publicly held company, sells a 
program that refunds some money if IVF is unsuccessful.51 IntegraMed reports 
that revenue from this program increased twenty-three percent in the first six 
months of 2008 from the same period in 2007.52 Advanced Reproductive Care 
 
 49. See THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 63 tbl.2.1 (describing package deals and refund programs that 
charge $27,000 for three rounds of IVF and refund $20,000 if the patient is not pregnant within a year); 
id. at 237 (discussing flat-fee unlimited-service plans). The American Medical Association Code of 
Medical Ethics generally discourages making fees contingent on the successful outcome of medical 
treatment. See American Medical Association Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 6.01 (1994). For a 
critique of that position, see David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, You Get What You Pay For: Result-
Based Compensation for Health Care, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1427 (2001). 
 50. See Schmittlein & Morrison, supra note 44, at 1618, 1632 (“Our analysis suggests that 
guarantees . . . are made economically viable for clinics by pursuit of less-infertile couples who are in 
the beginning stages of fertility assistance, rather than using IVF as a ‘last resort’ as had been the case 
previously.”); id. at 1619 (“The guarantees are viable if new, relatively fertile couples are induced to 
proceed directly to IVF instead of trying natural conception or less invasive procedures. For these 
couples, on standard economic bases, these IVF ‘guarantees’ are not a good deal.”). See generally 
Noah, supra note 8, at 613 (discussing whether some doctors start treating infertility too early). Cf. Lisa 
Barrett Mann, A Baby, or Cash Back: Some IVF Centers Offer Risk-Sharing Deals, WASH. POST, May 
18, 2004, at HE01 (reporting that encouraging earlier IVF increases the chances of success). But see 
David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, supra note 49, at 1469 (critiquing Schmittlein and Morrison’s 
interpretation of their results). 
 51. IntegraMed claims that one out of five IVF procedures in the United States is performed by an 
associated fertility practice. Press Release, IntegraMed America, Inc., IntegraMed President & CEO 
Jay Higham Named Ernst & Young Metro New York Entrepreneur of the Year 2008 Award Winner 
(June 30, 2008), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS95456+30-Jun-2008+BW 
20080630. IntegraMed’s recent SEC filing describes two relevant divisions as follows: 
Our Fertility Centers Division is comprised of a provider network of 10 contracted fertility 
centers located in major markets across the United States. We offer products and services to 
these providers designed to support the fertility centers’ growth. This division also supports a 
Council of Physicians and Scientists, as well as ARTIC, a captive insurance company which 
provides malpractice insurance to member physicians. Our Consumer Services Division offers 
products directly to fertility patients. The division’s Shared Risk(R) Refund and financing 
programs are designed to make the treatment process easier and more affordable for patients. 
As of June 30, 2008, the division maintained a contracted network of 22 independent fertility 
clinics under its Affiliate program which is designed to distribute the division’s products and 
services to a wider group of patients than just those serviced by our Fertility Center locations. 
The division also offers fertility medications directly to patients via a competitively priced 
mail-order pharmacy. 
IntegraMed, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 8 (June 30, 2008). See generally Greg Borzo, National 
Networks Try to Attract Infertility Patients, OB/GYN NEWS, Feb. 15, 2001, at 1; Marilyn Case, Doctors 
Begin Offering Creative Payment Plans for Fertility Treatment, WALL. ST. J., Sept. 8, 2000, at B1. 
IntegraMed collects accounts receivable for the clinics in its network. See IntegraMed, Quarterly 
Report (Form 10-Q), at 23 (June 30, 2008). 
 52. IntegraMed, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 18 (June 30, 2008). IntegraMed’s second-
quarter profits in 2008 rose forty-six percent. See Market Watch, IntegraMed Q2 Revenue Grows 46%, 
Drives 19% Rise in Net Income, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS132468+31-Jul-2008 
+BW20080731(last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
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(ARC), privately held and significantly doctor-owned, offers package deals on 
IVF treatments and refund guarantees if no live birth results.53 Even if intended 
parents participate in these programs, however, they still need money to pay. 
Intended parents have employed a variety of creative methods for funding 
assisted reproduction or adoption, including borrowing money from friends and 
family,54 pulling money from savings and retirement accounts,55 pawning or 
selling property,56 sharing prescription drugs,57 “donating” extra fertilized eggs to 
obtain a discount on fertility services,58 participating in clinical trials,59 joining 
 
 53. ARC reports that its associated clinics represent thirty-five percent of the IVF market. 
Advanced Reproductive Care, ARC’s Background, http://www.arcfertility.com/employers/back 
grounder.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
 54. See, e.g., Ewing v. Ewing, No. 06-CA-148, 2007 WL 4563458, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 
2007) (using the mother’s money to partially finance fertility treatments); Robert J. Stillman, A 47-
Year-Old Woman with Fertility Problems Who Desires a Multiple Pregnancy, 297 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
858, 859 (2007) (“I did have an insurance carrier that covered my first couple of IVF treatments. But 
after that, they’re not covering anything anymore. So I have had to, you know, get some money from 
some of my relatives.”); Esther B. Fein, Calling Infertility a Disease, Couples Battle with Insurers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 22, 1998, §1, at 1 (“If [couples with fertility problems] can, they usually then borrow from 
relatives or friends.”); NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR FIN. EDUC., HOW TO MAKE ADOPTION AN 
AFFORDABLE OPTION 36–37, available at http://www.smartaboutmoney.org/nefe/uploadfiles/Adoption 
Option.pdf [hereinafter NEFE] (listing relatives as a source of adoption financing). 
 55. See, e.g., Ewing, 2007 WL 4563458, at *16 (describing how funds for IVF were drawn from a 
401(k) account, a life insurance policy, and a gift from the mother). The National Endowment for 
Financial Education lists loans against retirement funds as a source of adoption cash, but also notes the 
risks to long-term financial stability. NEFE, supra note 54, at 36–37; see also Mary Jo Feldstein, 
Creative Financing Plans Aimed at Steep Infertility Treatment Costs, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), 
Sept. 3, 2006, at 7E [hereinafter Feldstein, Creative Financing Plans]; Mary Jo Feldstein, The Cost of 
Conception, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 6, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Feldstein, The Cost of 
Conception] (discussing the use of savings to pay for $40,000 to $50,000 in fertility treatments). 
 56. See, e.g., Fein, supra note 54; In re Pisko, 364 B.R. 107, 110 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) 
(adjudicating the case of a couple who sold their house and used $12,000 of the proceeds to pay for 
Honduran adoption expenses rather than for delinquent federal taxes). 
 57. See, e.g., Fein, supra note 54 (describing a “drug cooperative for needy, infertile women from 
the local Orthodox Jewish community”). 
 58. See Russell Korobkin, Buying and Selling Human Tissues for Stem Cell Research, 49 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 45, 51 n.35, 54, 58 (2007) (discussing discounted fees for “oocyte sharing”); id. at 65 (noting that 
the United Kingdom disallows payment for eggs but permits reduced-price treatments to egg donors); 
see also BARTHOLET supra note 12, at 221 (“Patients in some programs pay for part of their treatment 
by agreeing to surrender some of the eggs or embryos that they produce for use by others.”); 
THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 257 (discussing example from Brazil); Appleton, supra note 12, at 422 
(citing examples of “egg sharing” financing); June Carbone & Paige Gottheim, Markets, Subsidies, 
Regulation, and Trust: Building Ethical Understandings into the Market for Fertility Services, 9 J. 
GENDER RACE & JUST. 509, 515 (2005) (noting that obtaining additional unused eggs from women 
undergoing IVF often involves “less inconvenience and expense” than purchasing them from other 
donors); Roberts, supra note 17, at 941 (same); IntegraMed Fertility Network, Shared Risk for IVF 
Treatment Plan—Boost success and control IVF costs, http://www.integramed.com/inmdweb/content/ 
cons/shared.jsp (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
 59. See Janet L. Dolgin, The Evolution of the “Patient”: Shifts in Attitudes About Consent, Genetic 
Information, and Commercialization in Health Care, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 137, 176 (2005) (citing 
Antonio Regalado, Clinical Trials Offer In-Vitro at a Discount, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2004, at D1). 
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the military,60 draining flexible medical-spending accounts,61 taking additional 
jobs,62 and encouraging friends and family to shop via programs that dedicate 
percentages of purchases to adoption accounts.63 People also move to states that 
mandate coverage of their desired services or engage in overseas fertility 
tourism. 
Some methods of raising funds for assisted reproduction or adoption are 
more extreme. In one case, a woman represented to her ex-fiancé that she 
needed to use his credit card to finance $8700 for “surgery and therapy for a 
life-threatening blood disorder,” and, once she had secured permission, used 
the credit card instead for IVF.64 In another, a Colorado lawyer used funds 
embezzled from his law firm to pay debts incurred for fertility treatments and 
adoption fees.65 
D. The Missing Link of Credit and Debt 
In other contexts, scholars routinely discuss consumer credit as a method of 
smoothing lifecycle consumption to overcome temporal mismatches between a 
household’s financial means and various wants and needs.66 Surprisingly, 
however, little systematic attention has been given to the role of formal credit—
and simple debt—in the parenthood market. A review of case law, scholarly 
commentary, and the media reveals mostly anecdotal references to paying for 
 
 60. See, e.g., Child Welfare Information Gateway, Military Families and Adoption, http://www. 
childwelfare.gov/pubs/f_milita.cfm (last visited June 24, 2008) (discussing the adoption subsidy for 
military families). 
 61. See, e.g., Chen May Yee & Josephine Marcotty, Miracles for Sale: With Rising Competition, 
Some IVF Clinics Are Offering Money-Back Guarantees and Going Farther Afield to Look for Patients, 
MINN. STAR TRIB., Oct. 22, 2007 (reporting on one person who “cleaned out” FSA in addition to a 
“medical loan”). 
 62. See, e.g., Feldstein, supra note 54 (discussing working extra shifts to finance fertility 
treatments). 
 63. See, e.g., Buy For Charity, http://www.buyforcharity.com/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); 
iGive.com, http://www.igive.com/welcome/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); One Cause, http://www.one 
cause.com/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
 64. Colleen M. v. Fertility & Surgical Assocs. of Thousand Oaks, 132 Cal. App. 4th 1466, 1470 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
 65. Guyerson v. Colorado, 85 P.3d 1073, 1075 (Colo. 2004). Although later reinstated, Guyerson 
originally was disbarred. See Colorado v. Guyerson, 898 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Colo. 1995). 
 66. See Douglas Baird, Technology, Information, and Bankruptcy, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 310 
(discussing the benefits of a constant standard of living over years of fluctuating income); see also ERIC 
BELSKY & REN ESSENE, HARV. UNIV., JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, CONSUMER MORTGAGE 
CREDIT AT A CROSSROADS: PRESERVING EXPANDED ACCESS WHILE INFORMING CHOICES AND 
PROTECTING CONSUMERS (2008) (reviewing economic literature). According to the latest Survey of 
Consumer Finance data, the percentage of households with any type of debt—the most prevalent of 
which were home mortgages and installment loans (such as student and car loans)—reached 76.4 in 
2004. BRIAN K. BUCKS, ARTHUR B. KENNICKELL & KEVIN B. MOORE, FED. RESERVE BD., RECENT 
CHANGES IN U.S. FAMILY FINANCES: EVIDENCE FROM THE 2001 AND 2004 SURVEY OF CONSUMER 
FINANCES A25–A30 (2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss2/2004/bull0206.pdf. 
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fertility treatments or adoption with home-equity loans,67 credit cards,68 or 
general loans.69 
Some people who incur debt to overcome fertility barriers can be found in 
bankruptcy. In response to a general question about the source of the financial 
trouble, one bankruptcy filer reported, 
Our problems mainly stemmed from infertility. My husband [and] I both had two 
surgeries and insurance covered very little. We have spent the last five years trying to 
figure out why we couldn’t have a baby. I went through numerous procedures [and] 
nothing worked. We got in over our heads because [it’s] something I wanted so badly. 
We ended up finding out 2 m[on]ths after we first talked to the bankruptcy lawyer that 
we we[re] pregnant.70 
Case law provides several other examples of debt intertwined with fertility 
problems for bankruptcy filers. One financially troubled household used 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy to discharge about $200,000 of unsecured claims, which 
included debt for fertility treatments and adoption expenses running over $3600 
per month.71 Another couple unsuccessfully proposed a three-year Chapter 13 
 
 67. See, e.g., Ewing v. Ewing, No. 06-CA-148, 2007 WL 4563458, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 20, 
2007) (involving an intended parent using a home-equity line of credit to finance fertility treatments); 
SPAR, supra note 1, at 4; Feldstein, Creative Financing Plans, supra note 55 (reporting on the use of 
home-equity lines for fertility treatments); Feldstein, The Cost of Conception, supra note 55 (same); 
Justin Martin, A Baby or Your Money Back: Dr. Geoffrey Sher’s Fertility Clinics Promise Results and 
Deliver Profits. Some Rivals Find His Methods Unseemly. Others Imitate Them, FORTUNE, Nov. 10, 
2003 (discussing how a couple used a second mortgage to pay for an “outcome-based” assisted-
reproduction plan); Laurence Zuckerman, Couple Now Has No Savings, More Debt and Little Hope of 
Having a Baby, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1996, § 1, at 39 (reporting that $12,000 of a home-equity line of 
credit was used for gamete intrafallopian transfer plus embryo preservation); Some Discover Hopes of 
Family Lie with Insurer, AUGUSTA CHRON., Oct. 31, 2007, at A22 (reporting on the use of home-equity 
loans before changes in insurance to cover $20,000 of IVF). 
 68. See, e.g., In re Pobiner, 309 B.R. 405, 413 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2004) (discussing a $1685-per-
month credit-card obligation for fertility treatments); Daar, supra note 47, at 661–62 (describing how 
“patients either pay cash or use credit cards for all services”); Fein, supra note 54; Martin, supra note 67 
(discussing the use of credit cards to pay for an “outcome-based” plan); Liza Mundy, A Special Kind of 
Poverty: The Poor Get Used to Going Without. But Going Without a Baby is Hard to Get Used To, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2003, at W8; Zuckerman, supra note 67; Some Discover Hopes of Family Lie 
with Insurer, supra note 67 (reporting how a woman used credit cards before her husband’s insurance 
changed to cover $20,000 of IVF). 
 69. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 7, at 34 (referring to an IntegraMed advertisement for loan 
terms); Gena Kittner, Special Place in Brooklyn for Family; The Klahn Family Is Preparing Their Home 
for Four Siblings They Are Adopting from Russia to Join a Son Adopted Seven Years Ago, WIS. STATE 
J., Apr. 1, 2001, at A1 (reporting that a family took a $65,000 loan to adopt children from Russia). To 
supplement these observations, I combined other research paths with a review of the Web sites of 
Spar’s list of top fertility clinics and representative adoption agencies, as well as those of IntegraMed 
and ARC, for loan information. See SPAR, supra note 1, at 54 tbl.2–1 (listing the top twenty U.S. clinics 
by number of IVF cycles performed in 2002); id. at 179 tbl.6–1, 184 tbl.6–2 (listing typical domestic and 
international fees at adoption agencies). These observations are discussed in section III. 
 70. Case # W3-0938H, 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project (on file with author). 
 71. Pobiner, 309 B.R. at 413. This debtor sought to discharge student loans under 11 U.S.C. § 
523(a)(8) (2000) and the judge denied the request. This was based in part on the judge’s assessment 
that fertility and adoption expenses did not relate to maintaining a minimal standard of living, which is 
part of the undue-hardship test. Id. 
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payment plan in bankruptcy in which the filers proposed to spend over $800 per 
month on fertility treatments.72 
In summary, fulfilling goals of parenthood for those with fertility barriers 
continues to come with a hefty price tag. When governmentally subsidized 
approaches such as taxes or insurance are not comprehensive, the strong desire 
for parenthood propels people of modest means into a range of coping 
mechanisms from the mundane to the extreme. Given the central role consumer 
credit plays in other major household expenditures, it makes sense to focus 
more intently on the role of consumer debt in the parenthood market. 
III 
PARENTHOOD MARKET LOANS 
Notably, although one can imagine a market for parenthood loans for both 
adoption and assisted reproduction,73 today’s providers of specialty loan 
products seem to be marketing their wares either to assisted-reproduction 
customers or to adoption customers, but not to both. And once an intended 
parent has gone to a fertility clinic, it is unlikely that she will be counseled on 
adoption or adoption financing.74 Even a consultant report recommending that 
credit unions make loans for both adoption and fertility treatments suggests 
that borrowers will feel “more comfortable” if fertility loans are offered 
through doctors’ offices.75 What this means, then, is that two distinct loan 
markets have developed—one for each route to parenthood. 
 
 72. In re Bayless, 264 B.R. 719, 721 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1999). The court sustained American 
Express’s objection to the proposed fertility expenditure, denied confirmation of the plan, and 
dismissed the case: 
The Court can find no reported cases on the question of elective or discretionary medical 
treatments of any variety being funded through a Chapter 13 plan. This Court refuses to 
approve a plan that requires unsecured creditors to subsidize fertility treatments. While 
having children is a major life activity, it is not a necessary one, or one that cannot be 
postponed. On the contrary, in the modern era, it is simply another lifestyle choice. 
Id. at 721.  
 73. See MARK C. MEYER, FILENE RESEARCH INST., LIFESTYLE LENDING OFFERS INNOVATION 
AND GROWTH FOR CREDIT UNIONS 6, 8 (2005) (proposing that credit unions make loans for both 
adoption and fertility treatments). 
 74. According to Spar, 
During the course of fertility treatment . . . doctors do not typically suggest alternatives to 
their own form of treatment; they rarely advise their patients to contemplate adoption, foster 
care, or living without children. Such options simply are not within the confines of their 
profession: even though they are actually in the business of providing children for parents to 
raise, they define their role as curing infertility. 
SPAR, supra note 1, at 208–09; see also THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 95 (reporting on the sense among 
women in treatment that there always was something new to try, making it very difficult to stop 
treatment until a doctor declared options exhausted or finances lapsed); Neumann, supra note 27, at 
1225 (talking about how doctors treat the desire for a child as a medical problem rather than as a social 
problem that can be addressed in other ways). 
 75. MEYER, supra note 73, at 8. 
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A. Loans for Assisted Reproduction 
About a decade ago, a news story reported that fertility clinics that failed to 
require full payment at the time of services had low collection rates thereafter.76 
The Coker Group, a health-care consultant, advises in a report published by the 
American Medical Association that doctors should protect their own financial 
interests and should not extend credit to their patients.77 Some fertility providers 
simply do not follow this advice and become creditors of their patients for many 
thousands of dollars.78 
Other parties intentionally offer fertility credit, with doctors and clinics 
playing important roles in distribution. The most prominent lender appears to 
be Capital One Fertility, which is part of Capital One Healthcare Finance, 
which in turn is a subsidiary of Capital One Financial Corporation.79 Capital 
One Fertility “offer[s] loans from $1,500 to $40,000, giving . . . a flexible range 
of funds to help pay for fertility treatment options like Clomid, PCOS 
treatment, IVF, IUI, ICSI, surgery, tubal ligation reversals, and donor eggs.”80 
Capital One Fertility gets much support from other players in the assisted-
reproduction industry. Many Web sites of high-volume fertility clinics directly 
or indirectly refer visitors to Capital One.81 ARC and IntegraMed, the sellers of 
package deals and refund programs, also market Capital One Fertility to pay 
for these package deals.82 According to IntegraMed, a Capital One Fertility loan 
 
 76. See Roxanne Nelson, Financing Infertility, CNN.com, May 19, 1999, http://www.cnn.com/ 
HEALTH/women/9905/19/financing.infertility/ (noting that clinics experienced low collection rates 
when people were billed later—especially in the absence of a live birth). 
 77. See THE COKER GROUP, MAXIMIZING BILLING AND COLLECTIONS IN THE MEDICAL 
PRACTICE 43 (Am. Med. Ass’n 2007); see also Rhonda L. Rundle & Paul Davies, Hospitals Start to 
Seek Payment Upfront, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2004, at D1. 
 78. For an example of unpaid reproductive medical expenses of over $12,000 in a marriage-
dissolution case, see Darbelli v. Korbeh, No. FA044000730, 2005 WL 1219732, at *1–*2 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 2005) (allocating those expenses to the husband who sought divorce due to wife’s inability to bear 
children). See also Jane Gross, The Fight to Cover Infertility; Suit Says Employer’s Refusal to Pay Is 
Form of Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1998, at B1 (reporting on a patient paying a few hundred dollars per 
month on a debt of $10,000 to a fertility doctor who refuses to treat without payment ); cf. Cussins, 
supra note 41, at 72. 
 79. See Company Report for Capital One Healthcare Finance, Osiris, Jul. 10, 2008 (on file with 
Law and Contemporary Problems). The Healthcare Finance subsidiary reported operating revenue of 
$30.3 million in 2006 but does not separately list fertility revenue. Id. 
 80. Capital One Fertility, http://www.capitalonehealthcarefinance.com/fertility/ (last visited Feb. 
19, 2009) 
 81. Prominent clinics that link to or mention Capital One Fertility include Boston IVF, Highland 
Park IVF Center, Shady Grove Reproductive Science Center, Cooper Center for In Vitro Fertilization, 
Reproductive Biology Associates, Midwest Reproductive Medicine, Fertility Center of New England, 
Inc., and the New England Clinic of Reproductive Medicine. The Center for Advanced Reproductive 
Services at the University of Connecticut offers low-interest loans of up to $25,000 that appear to be 
funded by Capital One Fertility. The Center for Advanced Reproductive Services, Financial 
Counseling, http://www.uconnfertility.com/programs_patient.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
 82. ARC features an “affordable monthly payment plan” that is a Capital One Fertility loan. ARC 
Affordable Payment Plan, http://www.arcfertility.com/family_building/financial_services.html. 
IntegraMed offers “infertility financing” that is administered and offered by Capital One (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2009); see also IntegraMed, Infertility Financing—Apply for a Loan Now, http://www.integra 
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is available to people with a gross annual income of as little as $15,000.83 
Doctors must have a relationship with Capital One Fertility for their patients to 
use the credit at the clinic.84 As of 2006, Capital One Fertility had a nationwide 
network of 30,000 doctors who paid to participate in the program.85 Some 
doctors even have loan kiosks in their offices to facilitate the process.86 Capital 
One Fertility holds out the potential of loan approval “in minutes.”87 
Capital One Fertility loans are closed-end credit with fixed interest rates. 
The payment calculator on Capital One’s Web site shows a range of pricing for 
$20,000 and $40,000 loans. 
To borrow $20,000: 
 
Repayment Term Monthly Payments APR 
84 Months $344–$525 10.99%–25.99% 
36 Months $610–$815 5.99%–25.99% 
18 Months $1130–$1369 1.99%–25.99% 
To borrow $40,000: 
 
Repayment Term Monthly Payments APR 
84 Months $688–$1050 10.99%–25.99% 
36 Months $1220–$1629 5.99%–25.99% 
18 Months $2260–$2737 1.99%–25.99% 
Figure 1: Examples of Capital One Fertility Loan Pricing88 
If the forty-two-year-old patient from the introduction to this article were to 
repay her $20,000 loan over eighty-four months, she would pay $44,100 in total. 
This figure excludes fees, charges, and any increased rates that might be 
imposed if she paid late and does not capture repeated attempts at treatment 
beyond the scope of the first loan. The cost would match some of the priciest 
adoptions—except that her odds of ending up with a child would be lower.89 If 
 
medfertility.com/inmdweb/content/cons/financingpartners.jsp (last visited Feb. 19, 2009); Goodwin, 
supra note 7, at 34 (reporting on how the IntegraMed Web site encourages people to finance fertility 
treatments with loans). 
 83. IntegraMed Fertility Network, Finance—Application Form, https://integramed.feeplan.com/ 
form.asp?Plan=FFP&currPage=0 (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); see also Kathleen Kerr, Boom in the Baby 
Business, NEWSDAY, Oct. 18, 2007, at A42 (discussing loan terms). 
 84. Capital One’s Web site lists doctors by geography. See Capital One Healthcare Finance, Find A 
Doctor, http://www.capitalonehealthcarefinance.com/fertility/find.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
 85. Feldstein, The Cost of Conception, supra note 55. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Feldstein, Creative Financing Plans, supra note 55; Capital One HealthCare Finance, Fertility, 
http://www.capitalonehealthcarefinance.com/ fertility/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
 88. Capital One HealthCare Finance, Fertility, supra note 87. 
 89. See Neumann, supra note 27, at 1226 (comparing costs based on the likelihood of becoming a 
parent through adoption and IVF). 
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she repays the debt in eighteen months instead, her total debt would be 
$24,642. 
Capital One Fertility is not alone in soliciting assisted-reproduction 
customers for credit products. CareCredit, part of GE Money Bank, specifically 
advertises credit for fertility treatments as well as for services like weight loss, 
chiropractic treatment, and hair restoration.90 The joining of credit products for 
fertility treatments among other such services reinforces one line of perception 
that many advocates of fertility-insurance mandates strenuously oppose—that 
such assisted reproduction is a “luxury” rather than a medical need.91 
Other lenders agree to serve customers of particular fertility-service 
providers. The Institute for Reproductive Medicine and Science of Saint 
Barnabas sends patients to Wachovia Bank or PFS Patient Financing.92 The 
Home National Bank has a program with The World Egg Bank “to bring 
unprecedented affordability to frozen donor eggs to our recipients” through 
loans at “affordable interest rates” available through “easy online application 
and approval.”93 The World Egg Bank’s fee schedule anticipates that intended 
parents make bulk purchases of eggs (at least 5 or 6); thus, if 100 percent 
financed, the principal on the loans could hover around $15,000 or $20,000 for 
eggs alone.94 Because The World Egg Bank lists surrogacy prices on its fee 
schedule, it is possible that loans could be extended to such services as well, 
although the Web site does not explicitly note this. At one time, Citibank was 
reported to have an arrangement with a clinic in Brooklyn, New York.95 
 
 90. At least one sperm bank uses the CareCredit payment plan. Rene Almeling, Selling Genes, 
Selling Gender: Egg Agencies, Sperm Banks, and the Medical Market in Genetic Material, 72 AM. SOC. 
REV. 319, 333 (2007); see, e.g., CareCredit, The Choice Is Yours, http:// www.carecredit.com/other/ 
whycc.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); see also PFS Patient Financing Home Page, http://www.p-f-s. 
com/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); PFS Patient Financing, What We Do, http://www.p-f-s.com/consumer/ 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2008) (noted by some fertility clinics as providing loans, but on the Web site also 
advertising loans for “liposuction, hair restoration, and facelifts, as well as cosmetic and implant, and 
orthodontic dentistry, laser vision correction, dermatology, orthotics and prosthetics, home health 
equipment, bariatric treatments, behavioral medicine”). 
 91. See MEYER, supra note 73 (discussing fertility lending as part of a lifestyle lending portfolio); 
SPAR, supra note 1, at 217–24 (spelling out several alternative models, including the luxury model, for 
the regulation of the baby business); In re Bayless, 264 B.R. 719, 721 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1999) 
(referring to the use of assisted reproduction as a “lifestyle choice”). 
 92. The Institute for Reproductive Medicine and Science of Saint Barnabas, Financial Information, 
http://www.sbivf.com/financial_information.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). Like some other financiers, 
PFS’s business is not limited to fertility customers. See PFS Patient Financing Home Page, supra note 
90. 
 93. The World Egg Bank, Recipient’s Finance Option, http://www.theworldeggbank.com/The%20 
World%20Egg%20Bank/Recipients/egg-recipient-finance.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). The 
program is available to U.S. residents only. Id. 
 94. The World Egg Bank, Fee Schedule, http://www.theworldeggbank.com/The%20World%20 
Egg%20Bank/Recipients/egg-recipient-fee-schedule.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). 
 95. See Fein, supra note 54 (reporting on the relationship). “Brooklyn IVF” may now be “Genesis 
Fertility & Reproduction Medicine,” a member of IntegraMed. See Amy Waldman, For Childless 
Orthodox Jews, Fertility Treatment Is No Simple Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1997, § 13, at 8 
(describing Dr. Richard V. Grazi as the “director of Brooklyn IVF, an infertility clinic”); Genesis 
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Another clinic advertises that loans with up to a five-year repayment schedule 
are available through a local bank’s arrangement with a hospital,96 or refers 
patients to MedChoice Financial.97 For surgical procedures related to fertility, 
that clinic also offers a “24 Month Prepayment” plan under which, as the name 
suggests, the debtor prepays for the operation over two years—a service 
layaway plan that flips the debtor–creditor relationship.98 
The fertility loan is not exclusively a U.S. innovation. Indeed, the First 
National Bank, in Lebanon, claims to have been the pioneer of specialty loans 
for fertility treatments after experiencing success with plastic-surgery loans.99 
This bank offers online applications and “quick approval” for revolving loans to 
cover fertility and delivery costs, baby accessories, plus stem-cell collection and 
preservation cost, repayable over periods of up to thirty-six months.100 The loans 
cannot exceed certain (significant) portions of a borrower’s monthly income.101 
Borrowers should not be over the age of sixty-four when the term of the loan 
ends.102 According to a news account, a bank representative claimed to receive 
200 to 250 calls per day from potential customers after the bank advertised the 
loans on billboards.103 
B. Loans for Adoption 
The adoption loan market is similar to the assisted-reproduction loan 
market in that for-profit financial institutions also make adoption-specific loans. 
 
Fertility & Reproduction Medicine, Meet Our Team, http://genesisfertility.com/index.html (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2008) (including Dr. Grazi). 
 96. This clinic notes this financing in connection with two “unlimited service” plans: The 
FertileCare Gold Plan (Two Years) and the Preferred Plan (One Year). Babies by Levin, FertileCare 
Physician Service Agreement, http://www.babies-by-levin.com/psc_3.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008) 
(advertising a flat fee for unlimited services for one or two years). The Web site says the alternative is 
to “pay as you go” and “take your chances with your insurance.” Id. For patients who purchase tubal-
reversal surgery, this provider also offers free fertility treatments. Babies by Levin, Reversal Pricing, 
http://www.babies-by-levin.com/rev_10.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
 97. Babies by Levin, Payment Options, http://www.babies-by-levin.com/finance.htm (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2009). 
 98. A patient pays twenty-four monthly installments of $291.67 for an in-patient procedure or 
$258.33 for an out-patient procedure. Id. Higher-weight patients may have to pay more. Babies by 
Levin, Weight Table, http://www.babies-by-levin.com/prepay24.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2008). This 
provider also offers a “Fast-Track” program for patients who want tubal-ligation reversal quickly. 
Babies by Levin, Tubal Reversal—Fast-Track, http://www.babies-by-levin.com/fast_track.htm (last 
visited Sept. 11, 2008). A nonrefundable half of the cost must be paid to lock in the date. Id. The 
balance is due one week before the procedure. Id. “If the balance of the fee is not paid at that time and 
in that fashion then the procedure will be cancelled and will not be rescheduled.” Id. 
 99. First National Bank, Fertility Loan “The First of Its Kind,” http://www.fnb.com.lb/template. 
asp?id=170 (last visited Mar. 26, 2009). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Hayeon Lee, A Fertile Market: A Controversial New Loan Helps Lebanese Couples Conceive, 
NOW LEBANON, Aug. 25, 2008, available at http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID= 
56159. 
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But on the adoption side, nonprofit foundations are more heavily involved in 
financing as well, and some pursue nonpecuniary social objectives instead of 
high-interest payments and fees. 
Major adoption organizations have forged partnerships with financial 
institutions to offer secured and unsecured credit to help intended parents 
defray adoption costs. The National Council for Adoption (NCA) and Bank of 
America established a program for an adoption line of credit of up to $25,000, 
with repayment terms from twenty-four to eighty-four months.104 The National 
Adoption Foundation (NAF) and Bank of America also offer unsecured loan 
products: the National Adoption Foundation Visa Platinum Card,105 and a 
GoldOption Flexible Line of Credit of up to $25,000.106 In advertising this loan, 
NAF states, 
The National Adoption Foundation offers an unsecured loan program that gives 
families, whether renters or owners, an additional source of needed funds without 
pledging their homes or other forms of collateral. This program has proved 
enormously helpful, with very high approval rates. Over four thousand families have 
accomplished their dream through the NAF.107 
Prominent adoption agencies and foundations spread the word about the 
Bank of America loans.108 
Like fertility clinics, adoption agencies have developed direct connections to 
financial institutions for loans. For example, Families Thru International 
Adoption reports that Old National Bank will offer loans to its clients in five 
states, and Fifth Third Bank will do the same in seven states.109 Maps Adoption 
and Humanitarian Aid says Key Bank will provide adoption loans to intended 
parents at “very competitive rates.”110 Maps Adoption also recommends 
checking with local banks and credit unions for home-equity loans.111 Another 
tells potential parents that some banks offer “special rates and incentives” for 
 
 104. National Council for Adoption, Financing Your Adoption, https://www.adoptioncouncil.org/ 
resources/fianance_adoption.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
 105. National Adoption Foundation, Apply for a Card, http://www.nafadopt.org/NAF-credit-card/ 
NAF-credit-card.shtml (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
 106. Id.; Bank of America, GoldOption Flexible Line of Credit, http://www.fialoans.com/Gold 
Option/NationalAdoption/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
 107. National Adoption Foundation, Apply for a Card, supra note 105. 
 108. See, e.g., Dave Thomas Foundation for Adoption, Adoption Resources, http://www.dave 
thomasfoundation.org/Adoption-Resources/Adoption-Links#CMSNestedLinks_Id4 (linking to Bank of 
America)Wide Horizons for Children, Adoption ABC’s: General Adoption Funding Sources, http:// 
www.whfc.org/basics/FundingResources.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008) (linking to the National 
Adoption Foundation and the National Council for Adoption’s loan programs with consumer-credit 
providers). 
 109. Families Thru International Adoption, Grant and Loan Resources, http://www.ftia.org/grants 
loans.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). The Web site did not list terms. 
 110. Maps Adoption and Humanitarian Aid, Financial Aid for Adoption, http://www.mapsadopt. 
org/adoption/financialaid.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
 111. Id. 
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adoption loans.112 The funding for adoption loans from other organizations is 
not obviously from financial institutions. So, for example, Oxford Adoption 
Foundation, Inc., offers international adoption loans for up to $5000, with 
escalating interest over the nine-year repayment period.113 
Although some loans, such as those from Bank of America, are unsecured, 
others require collateral. The family home is likely to be the pledged asset, 
meaning that the home could be lost to foreclosure if the parents default on the 
adoption debt.114 For example, although some of the promotional material Web 
pages are no longer active, until very recently, JP Morgan Chase Bank had an 
arrangement with the Dave Thomas Foundation for Adoption to offer the 
Chase “New Additions” home-equity line of credit. The Dave Thomas 
Foundation is dedicated to increasing adoption out of the U.S. foster-care 
system, but it is not clear whether the line of credit shared that limit.115 The 
Chase New Additions line of credit had a one-percent teaser rate for the first 
six months and came with a payment card that could be used to access the line 
of credit.116 Through this program, an applicant could get a large enough loan—
in the hundreds of thousands of dollars—to pay off higher-priority mortgages, 
giving Chase a first-priority position.117 
Other entities that make adoption loans may condition approval on factors 
not directly related to the ability to repay. Some loans are available only for the 
adoption of children who are less in demand or more expensive to raise.118 For 
 
 112. American Adoptions, Financial Resources, http://www.americanadoptions.com/adopt/cost_ 
resources#adoption (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); see also Jeanie Wyatt, More than Money: Adoption 
Requires Financial Juggling, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS, Dec. 18, 2006, at 1E (recommending that 
potential users investigate loans carefully). 
 113. The interest rate on a nine-year loan is 0% for three years, 3% for three years, and 6% for 
three years. Oxford Adoption Foundation, Inc., Application Process, http://www.oxfordadoption.com/ 
application.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); Oxford Adoption Foundation, Inc., Promissory Note, 
http://www.oxfordadoption.com/promissory.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). In addition to basic 
financial information, the application requires a letter of introduction that includes family information, 
reasons for adopting, and reasons for seeking a low-interest loan. 
 114. I’ve found none that contemplate reproductive materials or babies as collateral, as scholars 
sometimes imagine. See Kevin H. Smith, Security Interests in Human Materials, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
127, 131 (1999) (hypothesizing human eggs as collateral and the steps needed for secured creditors to 
take possession under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code). 
 115. Dave Thomas Foundation for Adoption: Finding Forever Families for Children in Foster Care, 
http://www.davethomasfoundation.org (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). This foundation pledges not to 
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, marital status, or other such criteria. Id. 
 116. Chase, Chase New Additions (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems). 
 117. See Chase, Chase Home Equity Loan Application, http://www.chase.com/ccpmweb/home_ 
equity/document/heapplication.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
 118. For current gaps in supply and demand of children for adoption, see Erwin A. Blackstone et al., 
Market Segmentation in Child Adoption, 28 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 220, 220 (2008) (observing a 
mismatch between supply and demand and proposing that surpluses from adoptions of healthy white 
babies be used to subsidize adoptions of children less in demand); Krawiec, supra note 11, at 60 
(“Perhaps, in the absence of a sufficient number of healthy, white infants, prospective parents would be 
forced into the only sector of the baby trade that, sadly, does not suffer from a shortage of supply—the 
state-run foster care system, through which a disproportionate number of older, minority, and special 
needs children are available.”). 
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example, one agency offers loans of up to about $5000 for adopting children 
from China who are older or have special needs.119 Another makes loans of up 
to $4500, repayable over three years, to those who adopt through the agency’s 
African American Infant Program or who adopt children with special needs.120 
A third offers loans for up to $4000 for adopting children currently placed in 
foster care.121 
Availability of adoption loans sometimes depends on intended-parent 
characteristics and on the observance of traditional family structures. These 
loans replicate filtering based on parental characteristics that takes place earlier 
in the adoption process.122 Applications often ask for “family name” and 
information about the “mother” and the “father,”123 or “male applicant” and 
“female applicant,” even if marriage is not a loan requirement per se.124 Other 
organizations offer adoption loans (or grants) only to observant Christians.125 To 
get a loan from one such fund, applicants must be married, and the fund prefers 
that the mother not work outside the home.126 The loan application queries the 
borrower about church involvement, spiritual testimony, and what the potential 
parents intend for their children to learn regarding issues such as creation and 
 
 119. China Care, Financial Aid for American Adopting Families, http://www.chinacare.org/CHIN06 
5FinAidApp4.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
 120. World Association for Children and Parents, Financial Assistance, http://www.wacap.org/ 
FinancialAssistance.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
 121. Arkansas Adopt Today, U.S. Waiting Child Fund, http://www.arkansasadopttoday.org/USW 
CF.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
 122. See BARTHOLET supra note 12, at 33–34 (describing the “parental screening” process used by 
adoption agencies). For race discrimination in the parenthood market, see, for example, ROBERTS, 
supra note 7, at 246–93; Goodwin, supra note 13, at 70–71. 
 123. China Care, Adoption Financial Assistance, http://www.chinacare.org/CHIN065FinAidApp4. 
pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); Oxford Adoption Foundation, Inc., Application Process, http://www. 
oxfordadoption.com/application.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008) (referring to “mother applicant” and 
“father applicant”). 
 124. A Child Waits Foundation, Borrowers Consent Form, http://www.achildwaits.org/forms/ 
consentform.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); A Child Waits Foundation, Low Interest Loan Program 
Questions and Answers, http://www.achildwaits.org/Foundationinfo.htm (last visited Sept.18, 2008). 
 125. See, e.g., The ABBA Fund, FAQ, http://www.abbafund.org/faq.html (last visited Sept. 18, 
2008); see also God’s Grace Adoption Ministry, Application for Financial Aid, http://www.ggam.org/ 
main.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2008) (offering grants between $1000 and $4000 to married couples 
with incomes of $60,000 or less to put toward international adoption, reporting an average grant of 
$2000, and asking applicants to give their Christian testimony); Life International, Adoption Grant and 
Loan Application, http://www.lifeintl.org/images/downloads/Application.pdf (last visited Sept. 27, 2008) 
(asking for a “personal statement of faith” as part of the grant application); Lifesong for Orphans, 
Adoption Grants and Loans, http://www.lifesongfororphans.org/images/downloads/GrantsLoansInfo. 
pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2008) (discussing matching grants, interest-free loans, and fundraising 
support); Lifesong for Orphans, Loan FAQ, http://www.lifesongfororphans.org/images/downloads/ 
LoanGrantFAQ.pdf (last visited Sept. 18, 2008) (“The couple agrees to exercise financial stewardship 
responsibility to both LifeSong and to God, to use funds that God provides to them to reimburse 
LifeSong for the financial assistance that God graciously provided.”). 
 126. The ABBA Fund, supra note 125. The application requests information about the “adopting 
father” and “adopting mother” and the adopting mother’s maiden name. The ABBA Fund, 
Application for Adoption Financial Assistance, http://www.abbafund.org/applicationforassistance.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
07_JACOBY_BOOK PROOF.DOC 10/26/2009  1:58:51 PM 
168 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 72:147 
redemption.127 Some of these loan applications ask whether the applicants 
already have biological children.128 Another organization provides interest-free 
loans for adoption of up to $10,000, repayable over two to five years, but only to 
Jewish residents of Northern California.129 Moreover, borrowers need not be 
married, a policy reflected on the organization’s Web site featuring a single 
woman who adopted her daughter from Russia.130 
Foundations or agencies might also screen borrowers for what might be 
described as desperation. For example, A Child Waits Foundation offers a low-
interest loan program for international adoptions. These loans can be extended 
for up to $10,000 or fifty percent of adoption expenses, repayable at five-
percent interest over five years.131 However, loan approval also seems to be 
conditioned on the following: 
Before potential adoptive families apply to the foundation, they should first try to 
obtain funds from other sources such as friends, relatives and home equity loans. Our 
loans are not a low cost alternative to other financing options; rather they are a last 
means of financing for families who have already exhausted all other possibilities and 
funds.132 
IV 
DISCUSSION 
The idea of a commercial market for parenthood inevitably touches a 
variety of “societal nerves.”133 Yet the establishment of industry-specific loan 
 
 127. The ABBA Fund, Application for Adoption Financial Assistance, supra note 126. Another 
application inquires about the applicant’s definition of “eternal salvation” and similar concepts. 
Lifesong for Orphans, Adoption Grant and Loan Application, supra note 125. Life International’s 
application for international adoption includes a religious statement that, among other things, asks 
applicants to describe their daily walk with God, to share salvation testimonies, and asks how God has 
led the applicant to adopt. Life International, supra note 125. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Hebrew Free Loan, Home Page, http://www.hflasf.org/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2008); Hebrew 
Free Loan, Overview of Our Loan Program, http://www.hflasf.org/loanoverview.html (last visited Sept. 
18, 2008); Hebrew Free Loan, Types of Loans Available, http://www.hflasf.org/loantypes.html (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2008). Applicants need third parties to co-sign or pledge collateral. Hebrew Free Loan, 
How to Apply for an HFLA Loan, http://www.hflasf.org/loanapply.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2008). 
 130. See Hebrew Free Loan, Client Success Stories, http://www.hflasf.org/clientstories.html#suzanne 
(last visited Sept. 18, 2008) (explaining how a mother used her loan to adopt a girl from a Moscow 
orphanage). 
 131. A Child Waits Foundation, Low Interest Loan Program Application Process, 
http://www.achildwaits.org/howtoapply.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2008) (emphasis added). There is no 
prepayment penalty. See id. This loan requires automatic withdrawal from bank accounts for 
repayment. See id. If the loan defaults, the borrowers are responsible for one third of collection costs 
and the foundation’s attorneys’ fees. Id. Late payments have late charges of ten percent. Id. Like other 
organizations, A Child Waits may request to use the child’s picture and story but consent to this does 
not affect loan determination. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Sunny Samaritans and Egomaniacs: Price Fixing in the Gamete Market, 
72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 61 (Summer 2009). See generally Philip E. Tetlock, Coping with 
Trade-Offs: Psychological Constraints and Political Implications, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: 
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products reinforces the fundamental descriptive claim that this market is in full 
swing.134 This section explores implications relating particularly to assisted 
reproduction, leaving some of the adoption loan issues for future investigation. 
The prospect of a fruitful collaboration between lenders and assisted-
reproduction service providers across the country suggests that the consumer 
credit industry should be incorporated into political-economy accounts of the 
parenthood market. Consumer lenders are powerful political actors.135 If they 
become repeat players in the baby business, they join the ranks of parties who 
shape this trade.136 
Lender involvement might indirectly fuel some calls for regulation. 
Commentators traditionally have referred to assisted reproduction as serving a 
largely “elite” clientele.137 Providers of fertility services and money-back 
 
COGNITION, CHOICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY 253 (Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000) 
(discussing fears of taboo trades, such as baby auctions). 
 134. See SPAR, supra note 1, at xv, 3, 101, 207(describing the growth of the baby industry despite 
popular protests); Appleton, supra note 12, at 421; Margaret F. Brinig, The Effect of Transaction Costs 
on the Market for Babies, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 553, 554 (1994) (“The truth is that an adoption 
market already exists, however distasteful that may seem.”); Dolgin, supra note 59, at 157, 175–80 
(describing the business of infertility treatment); Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full 
Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2332 (1995) (referring to a “gray market (where fees go 
to the brokers, lawyers, and doctors who handle these transactions, and to the (inflated) medical 
expenses of the mother)”); Ertman, supra note 6, at 15 (discussing the costs of alternative insemination 
procedures); Goodwin, supra note 7, at 17 (describing “an incredibly active infertility marketplace”); 
Goodwin, supra note 13, at 64–66 (describing “evidence of a de facto, largely unregulated, adoption free 
market”); Krawiec, supra note 11 (“Throughout the world, in fact, baby selling is formally prohibited. 
And throughout the world babies are bought and sold each day.”); Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for 
Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163, 165 (2000) (explaining “a marked and widespread unwillingness to 
acknowledge the essential role of commerce in the distribution and allocation of human biological 
materials”); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59, 60 
(1987) (discussing misconceptions about the “efficiency” of exchanging money for babies); Elizabeth J. 
Samuels, Time to Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers’ Consents to the Adoption of Their Newborn 
Infants, 72 TENN. L. REV. 509, 519 (2005) (“The market features and the role of money in infant 
adoption raise ethical questions related to the decisionmaking of mothers.”); Carol Sanger, Developing 
Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 71 (2007) (discussing 
“the economic framework of a developing market”); Debora L. Spar, For Love and Money: The 
Political Economy of Commercial Surrogacy, 12 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 287, 289, 304–05 (2005) 
(discussing surrogacy as a commercial arrangement). 
 135. For the industry’s power in bankruptcy-law debates in public and behind the scenes, see, for 
example, Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation Through the News Media, 41 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1091 (2004); Victoria A. Nourse & Jane Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A 
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002). 
 136. See, e.g., Pamela D. Bridgewater, Reconstructing Rationality: Towards a Critical Economic 
Theory of Reproduction, 56 EMORY L.J. 1215, 1224 (2007) (listing parties who shape the baby business 
in the absence of government regulation). 
 137. See Schmidt, supra note 25, at 444 (reporting on the characteristics of those who receive 
fertility treatments); see also Cussins, supra note 41, at 73 (discussing a split among fertility 
professionals as to whether an elite clientele was an aspiration or a problem); Crossley, supra note 39, 
at 278 (discussing how disparate finances and the lack of insurance produces unequal access to assisted 
reproduction). See generally ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 247–64 (discussing the privileged lifestyle that 
IVF or similar procedures require). 
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guarantees want a broader customer base.138 To achieve this expansion, they 
must move beyond the elite to those of more-modest means. Specialty 
consumer credit could be a key ingredient to this expansion, particularly when 
partnered with other financial products such as money-back guarantees. Clinics 
stand to gain by promoting consumer-credit arrangements even if they do not 
originate the loan or profit directly from the credit extension.139 If fertility credit 
expands access for people of modest means as predicted, tensions in assisted 
reproduction could be magnified. For example, some “successful” parents may 
have difficulty managing the financial consequences that result from, say, twins, 
triplets, or more after being implanted with multiple embryos. This in turn 
could increase the pressure to regulate doctors’ implantation practices with 
greater rigor. 
In addition to the consequences that arise from facilitating broader access, 
lenders’ preferences could impact the market in a variety of ways. To provoke 
future work on this question, I close by briefly offering three examples. 
First, repeat-playing lenders arguably have a financial stake in the debate 
over compensation to women who supply “donor” eggs. Particularly in the 
absence of a unified loan market that includes adoption, lenders might benefit if 
the egg trade were opened to market forces, although it is possible that the 
status quo of functionally capped prices would better serve their interests.140 
 
 138. See generally Martin, supra note 67 (discussing Sher’s “embrace of information technology” 
and Internet outreach); Gina Kolata, Fertility Inc.: Clinics Race to Lure Clients, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 
2002 (reporting on fertility specialists trying to attract attention through their Web sites and noting 
“[s]ince most patients pay with their own money, in cash, and cash-paying patients can pretty much pick 
and choose where they go, fertility specialists say that if they want to survive, they have to get the 
attention of both patients and referring doctors”); Yee & Marcotty, supra note 61 (discussing how 
“pursuers” of fertility treatments “have become the pursued,” and discussing how industry is “thriving” 
on the Internet, in part through featuring services and special deals on Web sites); Hamilton & 
McManus, supra note 47 (studying early movers offering new reproductive technology and comparing 
their impact in competitive markets and monopoly markets); id. at 25 (recommending future study on 
how firms differentiate themselves); see also THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 88 (describing how the supply 
of infertility procedures started to “outstrip demand” in some places); Sandelowski & de Lacey, supra 
note 27, at 41 (discussing various models of infertility and how consumer models underemphasize 
efforts of the fertility industry to create products to sell); Fred Scaglione, Conceiving Profits in Fertility 
Medicine, EQUITIES, Spring 2006, at 10 (citing IntegraMed’s president predicting that the fertility 
market could grow four-fold). 
 139. In some medical-credit models, lenders have recourse against medical providers if their 
patients do not pay. See Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An 
Alternative Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 535, 559 (2006) 
(discussing various medical-credit relationships and role of medical-credit providers in medical 
providers’ accounts-receivable management). For problems with the commercialization of the patient 
provider relationship, see generally Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, 
Contracts, and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643 (2007). 
 140. See Krawiec, supra note 11, at 57–58 (noting “inefficiently low supply, high consumer prices, 
and distributional disparities stemming from the distorted division of profits”); Krawiec, supra note 
133, at 82 (explaining that, in an oligopsony, “consumers of fertility services are deprived of the full 
range and number of eggs that would be available to them in a free market”); id. at 65–66 (observing 
minimal egg donation in nations that have banned compensation); Mahoney, supra note 134, at 188. 
For similar discussions about organs, see Michele Goodwin, The Body Market: Race Politics & Private 
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Capital One Fertility specifically contemplates that and advertises that intended 
parents can borrow money for “donor eggs.”141 The Home National Bank 
likewise contemplates loaning for egg purchase in its joint program with The 
World Egg Bank.142 Given the interest rates associated with fertility credit, this 
presumably is a lucrative business for the lender, particularly for intended 
parents who need third-party eggs to pursue assisted reproduction at all.143 Egg 
acquisition currently is a small portion of the overall parenthood market.144 But 
parenthood loans could expand this volume, especially if consumer credit 
attracts older women with a greater need for donor eggs.145 
Second, because they should perceive same-sex couples as a significant 
untapped demand for parenthood loans, lenders may seek to attract them as 
borrowers. In so doing, they may indirectly promote individualized decision-
making about child-bearing by nontraditional families. Significant proportions 
of gay men and women have expressed interest in parenting.146 Same-sex 
couples have structural fertility barriers that alternative insemination, 
 
Ordering, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 599, 603–10 (2007) (revisiting arguments against financial compensation for 
organ donors and responding to those arguments); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited 
Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1814, 1842 (2007) (discussing 
concern about financial coercion, but then comparing it to dangerous occupations with higher death 
rates than organ removal). 
 141. See Capital One Fertility, supra note 80. Eggs can be acquired through an intermediary if no 
family or friends have offered them. Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of 
Oocyte Donation, 2001 BYU L. REV. 107, 118; Bridgewater, supra note 136, at 1224; Krawiec, supra 
note 11, at 20; Krawiec, supra note 133, at 63–64. 
 142. The World Egg Bank, Recipient’s Finance Option, supra note 93. 
 143. See supra III, fig.1 (reporting rates of interest). Lenders of course would not be alone in 
profiting from the parenthood trade. See Daar, supra note 47, at 661–62 (referring to the provision of 
reproductive technology as a “high profit business”); Krawiec, supra note 11, at 42 (“In the absence of 
similar attempts to control the prices charged by providers of fertility goods and services to customers, 
anti-commodification objections boil down to assertions that the ultimate supplier of the good—the egg 
donor—should be the only party not profiting from the transaction, or at least she should not profit too 
much.”); Lawrence J. Nelson et al., Taking the Train to a World of Strangers: Health Care Marketing 
and Ethics, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 36, 38 (1989) (discussing profitable fertility treatments paid in 
cash as in tension with doctors’ fiduciary obligations); Noah, supra note 8, at 614 (referring to fertility 
clinics as “lucrative profit centers” for the hospitals that establish them); Viviana A. Zelizer, Risky 
Exchanges, in BABY MARKETS: MONEY, MORALS, AND THE NEOPOLITICS OF CHOICE (forthcoming 
2009) (noting the lack of objection to medical professionals earning money for caring for babies or 
body parts). For a similar discussion of taboo organ markets, see, for example, Korobkin, supra note 58, 
at 46 (making a parallel argument about who profits from stem-cell research and regenerative 
medicine); Volokh, supra note 140, at 1815, 1834 (2007) (noting that hospitals and surgeons are paid 
“well” for their roles in transplants). 
 144. See SPAR, supra note 1, at 3, tbl.1-1 (reporting revenue from the 2004 fertility-treatment market 
by product or service). 
 145. There would be some limits to this growth if, as in some other countries, the United States 
restricted access to assisted reproduction for older intended parents. Heitman, supra note 16, at 92. 
 146. See GARY J. GATES ET AL., ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE BY GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2007), available at http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/ 
FinalAdoptionReport.pdf (reporting that over half of gay men and over forty percent of lesbians want 
to be parents). 
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surrogacy, and other procedures can address.147 In general, “the number of 
unmarried persons, including those who are gay or lesbian, who seek medical 
assistance to reproduce” has been on the rise.148 But the state imposes special 
obstacles on same-sex couples becoming parents. Parenthood lenders cannot 
counteract every obstacle, but they can weaken the financial ones. 
Although assisted reproduction is generally regarded as lightly regulated, 
lawmakers who do intervene often seem intent on promoting traditional family 
structures. Some lawmakers have sought to restrict access to assisted 
reproduction based on sexual orientation or marital status.149 No states mandate 
insurance coverage for assisted reproduction for same-sex couples.150 When 
states have mandated coverage, they often have defined infertility in a way that 
depends on heterosexual intercourse.151 This does not necessarily steer same-sex 
 
 147. See generally Ertman, supra note 6, at 37 (“One important effect of new family forms is that 
they increase agency for women and gay people generally by undermining patriarchal understandings 
of family.”); Robertson, supra note 42, at 12–13 (noting how assisted reproduction enables parenting in 
“novel family arrangements”). 
 148. ETHICS COMM. OF THE AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., ACCESS TO FERTILITY TREATMENT 
BY GAYS, LESBIANS, AND UNMARRIED PERSONS 1333, 1334 (2006) (exploring the implications of 
reproduction by single and homosexual individuals); Ertman, supra note 6, at 35 (noting increases in 
gay parenting likely due to alternative insemination); Robertson, supra note 9, at 349 (“[I]t is widely 
assumed that several thousand children are born each year from physician insemination of single 
women and lesbian couples.”). Experts cited in the media have estimated that at least five percent of 
fertility clinics’ clients are gay or lesbian. See, e.g., Carl T. Hall, Gays, Lesbians Seeking Parenthood 
Increasingly Turn to Infertility Clinics, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May 6, 2007, at A1. At the 
Reproductive Science Center of the San Francisco Bay Area, the rate may be as high as ten percent. Id. 
Regarding adoption, one agency reports that approximately five to ten percent of U.S. child adoptions 
are by unmarried people. Adoption Services, Single Parent Adoption, http://www. 
adoptionservices.org/adoption/adoption_single.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2008). The Evan B. Donaldson 
Institute reports that 1.3 percent of all adoptions completed by over 300 adoption agencies were to self-
identified homosexual parents. GATES ET AL., supra note 146, at 3. See generally William Meezan & 
Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and America’s Children, FUTURE CHILD., Fall 
2005, at 97, 98 (noting that though “[n]o one knows just how many American children are being raised 
by same-sex couples today,” conservatively, at least 166,000 children are being raised by gay and 
lesbian couples). 
 149. See, e.g., Daar, supra note 8, at 45–46. For example, Indiana State Senator Patricia Miller tried 
to introduce a bill that would have effectively prohibited single people from undergoing fertility 
treatments. See id. She eventually dropped the bill because “[t]he issue [was] more complex than 
anticipated.” Joshua Claybourn, Legislator Drops Assisted Reproduction Bill, IND. BARRISTER, Oct. 5, 
2005, available at http://www.indianabarrister.com/archives/2005/10/legislator_drops_assisted_repr.html. 
Similarly, a Virginia house bill was introduced to prohibit licensed health providers from providing 
certain fertility treatments to unmarried women. Daar, supra note 8, at 45 (referring to H.B. 187, 2006 
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006)). The bill was opposed and dropped. Id. at 46. Nevertheless, a few 
states were successful in passing such legislation. Id. at 45, n.109 (referring to FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
742.15(1) (2005) and TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754(b) (2005)). 
 150. Monahan, supra note 9, at 48. 
 151. THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 216 (giving an example of a lesbian couple with insurance 
coverage who were told that they could not satisfy definition of infertile without heterosexual 
intercourse); Bridgewater, supra note 136, at 1225 (“In addition to being priced out of the market, a 
number of buyers explore other markets for the most favorable legislative framework governing the 
reproductive markets and their participants.”); Goodwin, supra note 7, at 18 n.89 (noting how 
traditional definitions of infertility omit gay couples). As of August 27, 2008, fifteen states have 
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intended parents toward adoption, for both the state and private parties 
discriminate perhaps even more against same-sex couples in adoption matters.152 
Financial institutions are unlikely to replicate this bias unless it relates more 
directly to underwriting.153 One complication to this analysis is that clinics are a 
 
adopted legislation requiring insurance coverage for infertility treatment to some extent. Of those 
states, six have expressly defined the term “infertility” in their statutes, and all six define “infertility” in 
the traditional sense. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55(b) (2008) (defining infertility as 
“either (1) the presence of a demonstrated condition recognized by a licensed physician and surgeon as 
a cause of infertility, or (2) the inability to conceive a pregnancy or to carry a pregnancy to a live birth 
after a year or more of regular sexual relations without contraception”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
38a-509(a) (2007) (defining infertility as the inability to conceive or sustain a pregnancy for a period of 
one year); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356m(c) (2008) (same); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47H 
(2008) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2J-4.23 (2007) (defining infertility as “the disease or condition that 
results in the abnormal function of the reproductive system such that a person is not able to: 
impregnate another person; conceive after two years of unprotected intercourse if the female partner is 
under 35 years of age, or one year of unprotected intercourse if the female partner is 35 years of age or 
older or one of the partners is considered medically sterile; or carry a pregnancy to live birth”); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS. § 27-20-20(b) (2007) (requiring an individual to be married in addition to being unable to 
conceive or sustain a pregnancy). It is possible but not a foregone conclusion that monthly artificial-
insemination attempts would count toward infertility. A pending federal proposal does not require 
marriage, but also uses the traditional infertility screening: 
Sec. 2707(a)(2) INFERTILITY DEFINED—For purposes of this section, the term 
“infertility” means a disease or condition that results in the abnormal function of the 
reproductive system, which results in—(A) the inability to conceive after 1 year of 
unprotected intercourse, or (B) the inability to carry a pregnancy to live birth. 
Family Building Act of 2007, H.R. 2892, 110th Cong. (2007). Some language is more general, but still is 
likely to be construed as the traditional definition. See, e.g., H.R. 1384, 2007-08 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. 
(Ga. 2008) (defining infertility as “the condition of an otherwise presumably healthy individual who is 
unable to conceive or sustain a pregnancy during a period of one year” and mandating coverage by 
insurance policies of “medically necessary expenses of diagnosis and treatment of infertility”). But cf. S. 
750, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2007) (premising insurance coverage on infertility treatment 
being recommended by the attending physician and performed in medically supervised facilities rather 
than on meeting a statutory definition of infertility). 
 152. See, e.g., GATES ET AL., supra note 148, at 3 (reviewing state restrictions on adoption and foster 
care); Robertson, supra note 9, at 336–37 (reviewing states prohibiting gay or lesbians from adopting); 
W. Bradford Wilcox & Robin Fretwell Wilson, Bringing Up Baby: Adoption, Marriage, and the Best 
Interests of the Child, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 883, 888 n.29, 889–90 (2006) (listing states 
prohibiting adoption by unmarried people); Christian Eichenlaub, Comment, “Minnesota Nice:” A 
Comparative Analysis of Minnesota’s Treatment of Adoption by Gay Couples, 5 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 
312, 315–28 (2008) (reviewing a spectrum of state approaches to the possibility of adoption by gay and 
lesbian couples). See generally THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 6 (discussing the state’s role in family 
creation through adoption “only according to tacit criteria of social engineering”). 
 153. For example, loans to single people could be different. After the enactment of the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (ECOA), some scholars observed that, from the perspective of women’s groups and 
civil-rights organizations, “lenders continue to deny loans to creditworthy consumers and practice 
gender and spousal discrimination.” Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, “Redlining,” and the Discriminatory 
Access to Loans, Credit, and Insurance: A Historical and Empirical Analysis of Consumers Who Sued 
Lenders and Insurers in Federal and State Courts, 1950–1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 583, 585–86 (1996) 
(arguing that ECOA has not achieved its goal of protecting at-risk consumers and courts have been 
inefficient in resolving discrimination claims). Allegations of sex discrimination in lending were 
commonly tied to allegations of marital discrimination. Elwin Griffith, The Quest for Fair Credit 
Reporting and Equal Credit Opportunity in Consumer Transactions, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 37, 106 n.321 
(1994) (noting that a creditor may request the designation of a courtesy title, such as “Mr.” or “Mrs.,” 
only if the application form states it is optional). According to one commentator, prior to ECOA, 
07_JACOBY_BOOK PROOF.DOC 10/26/2009  1:58:51 PM 
174 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 72:147 
major marketing and distribution channel for the loans. Some clinics have 
resisted serving same-sex couples or have manifested a “heterosexual norm.”154 
It is doubtful that financial institutions would sever ties to clinics on this basis 
alone, but refusing to serve same-sex intended parents is probably of declining 
frequency and, in some states, of dubious legality.155 Overall, one would expect a 
specialty loan market to advance the objectives of individuals and same-sex 
partners to become parents. In other words, lenders’ self-interest could make 
them an unexpected ally to those who argue that there is nothing to fear from 
allowing and enabling same-sex couples to become parents.156 
Third, financing through private debt may affect the quality of assisted-
reproduction services. Thinking optimistically, perhaps lenders would direct 
their financing business toward clinics with greater IVF success rates. This could 
be particularly rational if “successful” borrowers feel a greater commitment to 
pay. In addition, because multiple births impose substantial pressure on 
household budgets and thus reduce a borrower’s ability to repay, perhaps 
lenders would direct their business toward clinics that maximize singleton birth 
rates and minimize multiple birth rates. 
Thinking pessimistically, it seems unlikely that decisions of major consumer 
lenders to partner with clinics would be so carefully calibrated. Even more 
negatively, lenders might be more interested in financing successive rounds of 
 
“women were forced to answer questions on credit application forms that addressed age, sex, race, 
religion, birth control practices, and childbearing intentions.” Laura Eckert, Inclusion of Sexual 
Orientation Discrimination in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 103 COM. L.J. 311, 336 n.4 (1998). 
 154. See ROBERTS, supra note 7, at 248 (discussing how clinics reinforce traditional conceptions of 
family and may not serve “single women, lesbians, welfare recipients, and other women who are not 
considered good mothers”); id. at 247 (describing reproductive medicine as “more conforming than 
liberating”); THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 86 (discussing a heterosexual norm in observed clinics, 
particularly in the earlier days); Crossley, supra note 39, at 276 (reporting examples of clinics 
discriminating against same-sex couples); Heitman, supra note 16, at 94 (discussing a stable-marriage 
requirement at some clinics); Robertson, supra note 42, at 38 (balancing the rights of same-sex couples 
to have children with the professional discretion of providers); Robertson, supra note 9, at 325, 349 
(discussing clinics that screen out gay or lesbian patients and whether they have legal right to do so). 
But see Ertman, supra note 6, at 25–26 (noting a decline in discrimination at sperm banks for lesbian 
and single women who are attempting artificial or alternative insemination). 
 155. See, e.g., N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego County Superior Court, 44 
Cal. 4th 1145 (Cal. 2008) (finding that a doctor who refused to perform certain actions to provide 
fertility care to lesbian couple was not exempt from compliance with the California Unruh Civil Rights 
Act); Jacob M. Appel, May Doctors Refuse Infertility Treatments to Gay Patients?, HASTINGS CENTER 
REP., July–August 2006, at 20, 21 (“What remains unclear is whether physicians with bona fide 
religious objections to treating certain patients are exempt from these [statutory] proscriptions.”); 
Daar, supra note 8, at 22, 35, 43–44 (discussing some reproductive-medicine providers’ attempts to 
discriminate on the basis of marital status, sexual orientation, or disability); see also sources cited supra 
note 154. 
 156. For a review of the literature suggesting that children of same-sex couples are not at undue 
risk, see Meezan & Rauch, supra note 148; Charlotte Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents, 
15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 241–44 (2006) (reviewing studies and positions of major 
professional organizations); Robertson, supra note 42, at 38 (“The question remains, however, whether 
the right of gays to reproduce should be deemed so important that they should be protected against 
discrimination by ART providers who object to gay reproduction and rearing.”). 
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treatment (at potentially successively higher rates of interest), contraindicating 
higher initial live birth rates.157 
Understanding more about the parenthood loan market would help 
determine which direction lenders might nudge the quality of assisted 
reproduction. For example, knowing whether loans have been securitized, the 
extent to which loans are coupled with money-back guarantees, and the fee 
structure for late installment payments might help shed light on lenders’ interest 
in assisted reproduction quality. The important point for now, however, is that 
the arrival of lenders into assisted reproduction on a routine basis would be 
likely to have a previously unexplored impact on services. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
 Not only is there a parenthood market, but consumer lenders have joined 
it. Loans are available for the distinct purposes of buying the eggs of other 
women, accessing assisted reproduction with wildly variable success rates, or for 
adopting children—whether babies from Asia or teenagers from the American 
foster-care system. The lenders range from small, nonprofit, religious 
organizations to major, for-profit, financial-service corporations. Some want to 
perpetuate certain understandings about the traditional family, while others 
want collateral and cosignors. Lenders promote these credit products through 
close partnerships with medical providers, providers of money-back guarantees, 
and adoption agencies. 
 There is much to consider about parenthood loans—too much for one 
symposium contribution. Thus, the discussion section of this article highlighted 
some political-economy implications and questions for assisted reproduction. 
The express interest of for-profit fertility lenders in making loans to people of 
modest means, in close alliance with providers of services and money-back 
guarantees, suggests that this market could touch millions of intended parents 
who were thought unlikely to be able to pursue such a course. Merely by 
expanding access to a broader population, the debt financing of parenthood 
could increase the urgency of regulatory debates, while specific lender 
preferences could affect aspects of the assisted-reproduction industry in 
previously unexplored ways. 
 
 157. The structure of Capital One Fertility loans—fixed-installment loan rather than credit card or 
line of credit—obscures the possibility that borrowers often are repeat-loan customers. 
